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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Susan Masley Thomas n/k/a

Utah Court of Appeals

Susan Grahm

Case No. 20040364

Petitioner and Appellee,

Class 15

vs.
John Gurr Thomas

Appeal of Third District

Respondent and Appellant

Court
Civil No. 024900734
Order to show cause

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Jurisdictional Statement:
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (h) .

This is an Appeal of a final judgment from an Order to Show
Cause for Child Care Expenses in the Third District Court heard
by Commissioner Susan Bradford on March 10, 2004 with final
judgment entered on March 30, 2004. The case is the result of a
disagreement as to what constitutes reasonable and work related
child care verses personal or recreation related child care.
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Statement of the issues.
Issue 1 - Excessive Day Care
I.

Whether the Trial Court abused or exceeded its discretion
in judging that all of the child care cost are both
reasonable and work related. The court appears to have
limited its definition of reasonable to apply only to the
cost per day or hour of day care with no rational method
used to address the actual work requirements or income.

II.

Whether the Trial Court committed plain error when it
failed to enter specific, detailed findings supporting
its financial determinations.

Issue 2 - Day Care Costs Exceed Income
III. Whether the Court committed plain error in determining
that the day care was reasonable even though the income
generated was shown to be less than the cost of day care.

Standard of review:
This appeal involves mixed questions of fact and law. The
court exceeded its discretion and failed to enter specific
detail to support its findings. Questions of law are to be
reviewed for correctness. Including the following; Utah Code
Ann. §78-45-7.17. (1)

A n n o l 1 ami-
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Child care costs, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-

2. (23)

Definitions, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5.

Imputed

income. Issue regarding average income supported by

Griffith v.

Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1999). Issues of fact shall be
reviewed for clear error. Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018

Constitutional or Statutory Provisions
Determinative State Statutes
Among the determinative statutes are contained in the Utah
Code. The full text of the statutes is provided in the addendum,
while the more pertinent provisions of the statutes are set
forth below as follows: (highlights added)
1. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.17.

Child care costs.

1) The need to include child care costs in the child
support order is presumed, if the custodial parent or the
noncustodial parent, during extended parent-time, is
working and actually incurring the child care costs.
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2.

Definitions.

(23) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child
care costs for up to a full-time work week or training
schedule as necessitated by the employment or training of a
parent under Section 78-45-7.17.
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5.

Determination of gross income

-- Imputed income.
(7) (d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following
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conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the
parentsT minor children approach or equal the amount of
income the custodial parent can earn;.

Rules and guidelines
Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure

"Findings

whether based on oral or

evidence,

of factf

shall

due regard shall
to judge

not be set aside
be given

the credibility

52(a)

unless

clearly

to the opportunity
of the

documentary
erroneous,

of the trial

and
court

witnesses."

Definitions - From Blacks Law Dictionary:
Reasonable

1) Fair, Proper or Moderate under the
circumstances.
2) According to Reason.

Work

1) To exert effort; to perform, either
physically or mentally.
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Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case

This is an Appeal of a final judgment from an Order to Show
Cause for Child Care Expenses in the Third District Court heard
by Commissioner Susan Bradford on March 10, 2004.
The case is the result of a disagreement as to what
constitutes reasonable and work related child care expenses.

Course of Proceedings
Proceedings leading up to the case are a Letter from her
attorney on May 27, 2003 contained in Appendix G of the
Affidavit of John Thomas filed on March 5, 2004. My response is
in a letter dated June 11, 2003, contained in Appendix H of the
same affidavit, stating my concerns and asking if we could come
to an agreement. I received no response.
The next action was that I was served with an Order to Show
Cause on February 12, 2004.
I filed a detailed affidavit with the court on March 5,
2004.
Arguments were heard by Commissioner Susan Bradford in the
Third District Court on March 10, 2004.
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The petitioner presented an 1120S Corporate Tax form for
2002 showing Income of $7284, No Tax Form or Income information
was provided for 2003.

Excerpts from the Transcript of Proceedings
Underline and Bold added to key points.

Excerpts Regarding Skiing time and full day vs. part time day care.
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:
THE COURT: Okay. And I found the place of Susan's schedule.
Skis from 9:00 to 12:00, works on Ski News 12:00 to 5:00 three
days a week and so what she's charged him is the two or three
days, full days, is what you're saying. .
MAYCOCK: Exactly.
THE COURT: Not a 5-day week, only the - but she's charging
for those three hours skiing and the rest of the time on those
other three days when she working and that's the part when push
comes to shove, he's arguing wait a second, what about the skiless months? And has anyone looked at what it would be if you
took out - I don't know what the difference if you take out 9:00
to 12:00 on those days. Are they charging by the day or by the
hour?
MS. MAYCOCK: I'm sure they charge by the day. F
THE COURT: Okay, that's how most people charge and
sometimes it's a monthly fee and sometimes a daily fee. It

varies according to the daycare and so she's being charged a
daily rate. So for all intense purposes, would it matter whether
she was twiddling her thumbs or skiing MS. MAYCOCK: As opposed to skiing?
THE COURT: As opposed to skiing?
MS. MAYCOCK: I guess she could take longer to do the
administrative things.
THE COURT: That's what I would like to know. Does it make a
difference for our daycare purposes if she works on Ski News one
hour a day, three days a week, if for all intense purposes the
daycare is going to be charged at one rate for the day, in other
words, not an hourly rate? She's going to get charged if it's
$80 for two kids a day, she going to get charged for that $80
regardless of whether she does into an 1 office or works for one
hour or doesn't, is that the point? want to know if that's what
she's arguing?

Excerts from transcript regarding Income from Ski News
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:
THE COURT: Okay. I think I found where you were referring
to, sir. I hope I have and it was admitted entry by Commissioner
Arnett. I'm looking at page 5, March 18, 2002. It talks about
child support, "Finally, the child support guidelines provide
that income should not be imputed to a parent if that increased
child support costs incurred if she were to be employed, would

completely or largely consume such income" and that's what I was
referring to earlier. If you're going to have daycare costs that
are greater than your income, why do you go there? Here it
appears that petitioner has the "Primary care and custody of the
two pre-school children and prohibition against visitation would
apply. Petitioner's gross monthly income is $7,328 and he came
up with $1,189 as the child support amount which has ended by
being the final order in this but it looks like the temporary
order went with exactly the point I was asking which is when you
have daycare, if she were to work full-time at a minimum wage
job, let's put her anywhere right now, minimum wage and she
can't er daycare exceeds

it's roughly going to be $759 net,

you're probably going to exceed that in daycare for two small
children. That's where you say, why are we having someone work
full-time just to have it go out the door the other way where
we're both dividing it? That's what the statute and the code
takes into account. I'm assuming that's somewhere where you came
to this understanding. That's all I can extrapolate from looking
at the temporary order and what you have now. Whether that is
true for the future given the income that's now there as a part
me income, one can look at that on a Petition to Modify but
that's not before me today. That's a question that's left to the
two of and your devices down the road as you will through your
attorneys and whatnot. The only question for me today is the

daycare and so I think I understand where you're coming from and
you're saying, gee, we carried over some receipts that might
have been carried over from ^01 to

x

02 but that makes her income

look even less than it might have been in 2002 and tax returns
are not definitive on the Court. They can often be manipulated
into just about anything you want them to be manipulated into. I
understand that too and the Court is not bound by a tax return.

Excerpts from transcript regarding Day Care during Off Season
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:
MR. THOMAS: So I would disagree with the comment made
earlier. The other issues you'd raised had to do with the skiing
and whether that's work or not and then also the other point, in
her Exhibit B she has the daycare in Washington, she still
mentions skiing in that and I don't believe she's skiing from
9:00 to 12:00 however many days a week in Washington. It's
mostly for summer. She spends winters here in Salt Lake, roughly
November through April and summers in Tacoma, Washington and
makes occasional trips to a home in Phoenix.
THE COURT: So you're saying - and I'm looking at her
Exhibit B, this is the year 2002, she has a couple of days in
October 11, 18, 25 of 2002, November 1, 8 and then it skips down
to May.
MR. THOMAS: There are two pages I believe in that exhibit.

THE COURT: Am I missing something? I'm looking just at
Tacoma, just what you referred to. I'm not looking at the
Buttons and Bows, Salt Lake. I'm only looking at Tacoma.
MR. THOMAS: Yeah, there's a Tacoma Kinder Care and also An
Apple a Day in Tacoma. And that accounts for about half of the
childcare.
THE COURT: And that was mostly August. It looks like there
was one 7 day period in ^03 but most, if I'm to look at it as
skiing time, I don't see August as a skiing time unless I'm
mistaken there and your ex is noting that over there. She's
nodding and so is Ms. Maycock, just so you know that, sir. And
then I'm looking at the Tacoma Kinder Care and you know too, it
looks like it leaps from about November 8 then down to May 9th
of 2003.

Excerpts from transcript - More Days than necessitated by W o r k
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:

MR. THOMAS: And then the other point is just the number of
days. It mentioned two to three days a week. A lot of the weeks
look like it's three to four days a week on some of the weeks
and with March, really now is when the final issue for the year
has historically come out and after this time there's very
little, if anything, to do for the remainder, although the
skiing remains good through usually early May and it shows that

the daycare continues from early March through the end of April
at three to four days a week and again, the again, like I say
the last issue is out, there's no more articles to write.
THE COURT: So you would dispute say April 1st? And I'm
looking at her - it's Exhibit A now. It looks like it's a
summary so everybody knows where I'm looking. It's Exhibit A and
if we just take April 1 2003 10:00 to 5:45 and we just carry it
forward for April. If you were to give me a ski season, when
does Ski News not need to be published? When does one not lift a
finger on Ski News? What months and I mean absolutely nothing
for Ski News, nothing?
MR. THOMAS: There could always be little activities.
THE COURT: Did you do little activities on Ski News every
month?
MR. THOMAS: Could be ongoing collections, you know, things,
but it is a home based business and there may be an occasional
phone call that could be done with the children and 0
THE COURT: So can you answer what months you'd do
absolutely nothing for Ski News? If you were running Ski News
right now, would you let it lay fallow during April through
August? April through July? Tell me how you'd run it.
MR. THOMAS: Historically it was once the March issue was
distributed and invoices sent out, that was the end of the
season.
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THE COURT: So you do nothing in April, nothing in May,
nothing in June or July? What about August?
MR. THOMAS: I'd have to look. I'm not sure when Labor Day
is. There would be preparing for Labor Day.
THE COURT: So if I'm getting you correctly, you're saying
between April and basically July there's nothing to do on this
magazine? Nothing.
MR. THOMAS: July - yeah, like I say there are things you
could do if you wanted to.
THE COURT: If you wanted to make it a business that worked,
turn it into something that worked.
MR. THOMAS: Again, there's very little.
THE COURT: Okay, okay. Anything else you'd like to add, Mr.
Thomas, that I haven't grilled you on or covered with Mr.
Maycock and grilled her on?

Excerpts from Transcript - Days Necessitated by work.
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:
THE COURT: And I guess that goes back to my question
earlier. When you get daycare, the inherent problem with daycare
is you either pay a daily rate, you pay a monthly rate and
you're locked in. They don't give people - and yours is not the
first argument I've heard where people say wait a second, I'm
free on Tuesdays, why are we paying for Tuesdays and they're
locked in because they charge for a monthly rate whether you're

there Tuesday, whether the child is sick, whether you take them
on vacation, you pay the tab. They hold you to it and lock you
in and your argument to that, just like I gave them the same
question only in the reverse. I'm giving you the same question.
MR. THOMAS: That's correct, and I don't argue with the
quality of the daycare that's being provided but if you look at
the financial numbers, if this were her only means of income and
she were on a budget then I would think she would find
significantly less expensive daycare because she wouldn't be
able to pay the amount that she's paying for the daycare. She
may do, you know, work fewer days a week, consolidate that work
so instead of one hour each day on four days, she would have one
half day where she consolidates all her work and uses less
daycare. As a result - which I don't know if that falls under
voluntary underemployment?

Excerpts from Transcript Regarding Cost per Day or Hour
THE COURT: And that's going to be the issue that I brought
back earlier. This is a Petition to Modify issue. If there's
income that needs to be attributed to her, then that's not
before me today. That's a Petition to Modify and I think Ms.
Maycock alluded to the same thing and I think I have alluded to
that one. Though it's not before me, I'm looking at some of
these months here and I'm just looking at Buttons and Bows. For
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1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 days of January 7 to the 17 it looks like there
was a charge of $284. If everybody wants to look at that, that's
"Joey sick asthma." I don't know if he went that day or not but
let me take a better example. Let me just take th€> one up above
and then we're dealing with an illness. December 23 through
January 3 we have six days and it looks like there was a $284
charge for six days unless I'm reading that wrong or $47 a day
for two children divided by two, you're paying $23.66 for two
children over eight hours divided by eight, you're paying about
$2.95 an hour per child. I want to put it in prospective because
that's what you need to do when you look at this and you look at
what it's going to cost if someone had the children in full me
or part 5 time and as I see it, you've got six days, full
daycare $284 and I just divided it. It's $47 or $23 a child per
day and it looks like it's consistently somewhat that way
because then we have $142 that drops down in February of

A

03 and

I haven't broken the Tacoma apart at all. I can tell you I've
just done this right now, right here to see what they're
charging and if you were to go out and have her get full me
daycare somewhere else could you really get it cheaper? In other
words, let's say we had her work 40 hours a week at $5 an hour.
That's $893 a month or $759 net. You're going to spend more than
that at $47 a day times by just roughly 20 days a month, you're
doing to spend $940 a month in daycare for two children at $47 a

day and if you can beat that, let's say you could beat it and
you could get it for $40 a day, you'd spend $800. I don't know
how much you can beat this rate but again you get back to the
argument, full me care versus daycare because you're both going
to have to shell out half of that. Does it save you ultimately
dollars where you're dividing it in half? Well, if she were
working full me and you had it at $800 a month, you'd both have
to pay $400 a month. At $400 a month that's $4,800 a year each
of you are paying. Now you might be able to get a better deal,
maybe, maybe. I don't know but I think that's the prerogative of
the custodial parent to chose the daycare. Your prerogative is
to bring it back and have income imputed to her and certainly in
light of her 2002 tax return.

Excerpts from Transcript - Cost of Day care greater than Income
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:

MR. THOMAS:

As I pointed out earlier, I think the numbers

don't indicate that she shows income that year but it really
offsets a large loss the previous year.
THE COURT:

The loss the year before.

MR. THOMAS: So, you look at that, there really is no income
so essentially she spent $9,486 for childcare to generate no
income and partake of a lot of benefits including free ski
passes, free, you know, food, spa, a lot of benefits for what
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she says is work and that's all I have to go by is she says I'm
working, she sets her own hours, she sets her own schedule. If
she were working outside, she would have a job, she would have a
manager, she'd have set hours, set paycheck. It would be
something I think easier to document as opposed to just taking
her word that I'm working. I need to ski to work. And that's
really the bottom line as far as what I see. It doesn't seem
like a lot of the tasks are work related. It is a small, home
based, part-time effort that she puts in and it's mostly for
benefit and enjoyment. And I think if she would be doing it for
income, she wouldn't be able to spend that much on daycare and
basically I'm being asked to subsidize her recreation and
lifestyle through what I think is somewhat of an abuse of the
childcare provision as outlined in our decree.

Excerpts from Transcript - Excessive Number of Day Care Days
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:
THE COURT: So it's not the cost that's excessive to you,
it's that it shouldn't be being incurred at all because really a
part me job or for her benefit in essence. .
MR THOMAS: If she is making income then I think to the
degree that she's making income
THE COURT: It needs to be offset some way?
MR. THOMAS: It should be offset but I think the numbers
just don't make sense on the overall income from the business
-n

11

j_ T-> ,~.: ^ -c

r>->^r^

on

TnKn

TV-^/-\m ~n o

versus the cost of the daycare and again she appears to not have
limitations about how much she can spend on daycare so as a
result I think the costs are higher to allow her more time
THE COURT: But you just argued it wasn't excessive. •
MR THOMAS: I think the amount she's asking me to pay is
excessive.

The Courts Concluding Statement and Judgement
On March 10, 2004, The hearing proceeded as follows:
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I'm prepared to make a
recommendation. The only question for me is should there be a
judgment for daycare and if so how much? It's a unique question
because this is a unique case that deals with something that
involves typically what one would consider a hobby as well as a
job and so it's not typically where one goes to work in a coal
mine and you come out of the coal mine and you consider it a
hobby. Where one goes skiing to develop a newspaper, it sounds
much more like a hobby than going to work and the question for
me is, is this viable daycare? I think Mr. Thomas answered it
when he said it's not the amount of daycare that necessarily
excessive, he thinks that she's using it in excess, really for
her personal needs. I can't extrapolate from looking at her
daycare which ones would really be personal needs from the
business. I can't tell that. There's no way I'll be able to tell
that. I could sit here until doomsday and not be able to know

that one and so it appears that the judgment for the daycare is
appropriate. It is in your decree. I am bound by your decree
just as you are. That doesn't mean that Mr. Thomas doesn't have
recourse as it has been suggested not only by Ms. Maycock but by
myself. A Petition to Modify would look at this issue on the ski
business in a whole new vein because now we have a tax return
that's actually turning it into a profitable business and so
that makes it a whole different ball game. And so with that, I
leave you to develop that as you 1 may. That's completely and
entirely up to you. The judgment for the daycare will enter.
Attorney's fees in the amount of $300 because there is a
judgment for daycare. The withdrawal of the transportation issue
is noted. That's not an issue today. I think that deals with
everything today. Ms. Maycock needs to prepare that and send it
to Mr. Thomas for his approval and if he doesn't approve, then
it'll be submitted accordingly under the guidelines, and I
should note that the daily rate was being charged for daycare.
It was not an hourly rate and the Court did not find it to be
excessive or I would have had questions myself on that. It was
not an excessive rate and to Mr. Thomas's credit he didn't find
it excessive. It's his concern that there's skiing going on on.
his daycare time which the Court undestands and notes. Thank you
very much. (Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Disposition in Trial Court
There was a judgment for the petitioner for $4743.17 which
is H of the Total day care costs of $9486.33 in child care
expenses and $300 in legal fees. The final judgment entered on
March 30, 2004.
Notice of Appeal was filed on April 29, 2004.

Statement of Facts
Affidavit of Susan Graham filed February 10, 2004
contains the following:
1.

Statement on Exhibit A and B stating that "Susan's
Schedule: Skis from 9:00 - 12:00. Works on Ski News 12:00
- 5:00 - 3 days per week." The time period covered
includes time in Utah and Tacoma WA that are not during
the ski season.

2.

Day Care costs on her Exhibit A shows the following day
care that are in question regarding necessity for work as
they are well outside the normal work for Ski News.:
Utah - March 1 - April 23, 2003 - 26 Days - Cost $1586
Tacoma, WA - May 9-23, 2003 - 6 Days - Cost $406
Tacoma, WA - Sep 20 - Oct 25, 2002 - 16 Days - Cost $1264
Tacoma, WA - June 1-15, 2003 - 4 Days - Cost $220
Total - Out of Season Day Care: $3476

3.

Total Day Care Costs on her Exhibit A and B is $9486.33.
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4.

Total Income documentation provided on Form 1120S
Corporate Tax Form for tax year 2002 is $7284 which is
less than the total spent for Day care of 9486.33.
(* I find

it

interesting

of actual

income

for

although

the

hearing

deadline

for

Corporate

that
the

no documentation

tax year

was held
tax

or

mention

2003 was

provided

on March 10,

2004 and

returns

was March 15,

the

2004.)

The Affidavit of John Thomas filed on March 5, 2004
contains the following:
5.

Affidavit of John Thomas, filed March 5, 2004, item 12
regarding work activity states as follows:
"12)

Ski News is published during the ski season yet

many of the child care expenses are for times when there
is very little or no activity for Ski News.

After the

end of February when the March issue of Ski News is done
little if any work is required, yet the petitioner
continues with 3-4 days per week of day care from March
to June. The day care costs continue even after the
petitioner returns to Tacoma, WA where she spends most of
her time in the summer."
6.

Exhibit A shows the historical losses of Ski New from
1997 to 2001 with the following note:
"Invoices at the end of 2001 were sent out late causing
payments that would normally have been included in 2001

income to not be received until 2002 showing a larger
loss in 2001 and additional income in 2002."
7.

Exhibit B Form 1120S Corporate Tax Form shows a Loss for
2001, Line 21 Income ($7,089) a loss.
The following are multi year averages:
2 year average for 2001 and 2002 would be $100 income.
3 year average for 2000 to 2002 would be ($400) a loss.
4, 5 and 6 year average show an increasing loss.

State Statutes contain the following key phrases:
The full text of the statutes is provided in the addendum
8.

78-45-2 (23) "...as necessitated by the employment../'

9.

78-45-7.17 (1)" ... is working..."

10.

78-45-7.5 (7) (d) (i) "...reasonable costs of day care
approach or equal the amount of income..."

Key statements or phrases during the hearing on March 10, 2004.
11.

The Court: ..." What months and I mean absolutely nothing
for Ski News, nothing? " ...

12.

THE COURT: ... "So you do nothing in April, nothing in May,
nothing in June or July? What about August?"...

13.

MR. THOMAS:

Again, there's very little.

14.

The Court: ..." If you're going to have daycare costs that
are greater than your income, why do you go there? "..."why
are we having someone work full-time just to have it go
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out the door the other way where we're both dividing
it?"...
The Court: ..." Does it make a difference for our daycare
purposes if she works on Ski News one hour a day/ three
days a week, "... "
MR. THOMAS: ..."So, you look at that, there really is no
income so essentially she spent $9,486 for childcare to
generate no income."..." all I have to go by is she says
I'm working."...
The Court: ..."I can't extrapolate from looking at her
daycare which ones would really be personal needs from
the business. I can't tell that. There's no way I'll be
able to tell that. I could sit here until doomsday and
not be able to know that one and so it appears that the
judgment for the daycare is appropriate."...
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Summary of Argument
Issue 1 - Excessive Day Care
- Day Care that

is not Work Related

or reasonable

under

the

circumstances.
1. The Trial Court abused its discretion by judging that the
child care cost are both reasonable and work related by:
a) limiting its definition of reasonable to apply only to
the cost per day or hour of day care committed an error.
This indicates that as long as the cost per day is deemed
reasonable if it is work related does not matter.
b) No rational method used to address the actual work
requirements with no proof of work requirements provided.
2. The Trial Court failed to enter detailed findings showing
that the number and actual days of day care was
necessitated by work or employment.
3. The Trial Court exceeded discretion by setting "Absolutely
Nothing" as a threshold of reasonable in determining the
amount of day care that is work related. It was shown that:
a) A large portion of Child Day Care costs was for days
that there is extremely little or no work.
b) The time periods of some of the day care are in large
blocks and during times of very little or no work activity
that would allow them to be eliminated or greatly reduced.

Issue 2 - Day Care Costs Exceed Income
- Cost of Day Care exceeds

Income

4. The Trail Court committed an error in failing to address
and provide detailed findings on the issue of more day care
cost than the income generated.
5. No rational method was used to address the argument that
income was less than the cost to provide day care.
6. The result is that this would not allow for Imputed Income
but still allow the petitioner to get the benefits of Day
Care.
7. Given the facts provided and circumstances a more
reasonable method of determining income would be a multi
year average.

Argument
Issue 1 - Excessive Day Care
Ski News is a very smallf home based business whose sole
product or service is the publication of a Newspaper/Newsletter
that is published 5 times a year and distributed for Free on
approximately Labor Day, December 1, January 1, February 1 and
March 1.
Susan Graham, the petitioner/appellee, is the sole owner of
Ski News, there are no employees and she reports only to
herself. This allows for unlimited flexibility in how and when
she chooses to perform her ^work' tasks.
In her affidavit item 6 she states that "In order to
publish Ski News, I must ski and be involved in skiing myself."
She also states in her exhibit A and B that "Susan's Schedule:
Skis from 9:00 - 12:00; works on Ski News 12:00 - 5:00 - 3 days
per week. One day each month has to attend a board meeting."
This equates to her spending 40% of her "work time" Skiing.
I argued that this is not only questionable as *work' but
that it is also not a "Reasonable" amount of time and that if
this were eliminated or reduced, the *work' of ski news could be
done with 1-2 days a week of Day Care as opposed to the 3-4 days
a week shown in her Exhibit A and B.
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The court argued that it did not matter if she worked 1
hour a day and skied or twiddled her thumbs for the remaining
time since the day care was being changed at a daily rate not
hourly.
State statutes concerning Day Care state that terms such as
"... as necessitated by the employment..." and "...is working..." as the
criteria for including Day Care cost as part of the support.
There is no proof of her work schedule or requirements as
she reports only to herself and only her word as to what is
required and how long it takes. Again, this gives her unlimited
flexibility in choosing how, when and what constitutes ^work'.

Seasonal Work: In Season Day Care vs. Off Season Day Care.

The Seasonal nature of Ski News is involves work leading up
to the publication and distribution of each issue. In my
affidavit Item 12, I state that "... After the end of February when
the March issue of Ski News is done little if any work is
required, yet the petitioner continues with 3-4 days per week of
day care from March to June."
I argued that there was "very little" however the court
continued to ask for times when "Absolutely Nothing" needed to
be done.
Susan's affidavit, exhibit A and B, shows day care costs
for large blocks of time during the Off Season when very little

or no work activity is required. The largest block of Off Season
time includes 26 days of day care for 3-4 days a week from March
1 to April 23. Since the March issue is done in late February, I
argued that the primary reason for this day care is to allow
Susan to ski and for other personal needs, not for work. As she
states that she ^works' 2-3 days a week during the peak season,
this equates to about 12 ^work days' per issue. The question is,
Why does she need 26 days of day care when there is not another
issue until the next season.
There are several blocks of time that appear excessive and
well outside the Season for normal work for Ski News as follows:
Utah - March 1 - April 23, 2003 - 26 Days - Cost $1586
Tacoma, WA - May 9-23, 2003 - 6 Days - Cost $406
Tacoma, WA - Sep 20 - Oct 25, 2002 - 16 Days - Cost $1264
Tacoma, WA - June 1-15, 2003 - 4 Days - Cost $220
Total - Out of Season Day Care: $3476
During the hearing, the court kept asking only for times
that "Absolutely Nothing" could be done which I argue does not
allow for the determination of what is a reasonable amount
(number of days) of day care under the circumstances.
The courts judgment appears to allow for an unlimited
amount of day care regardless of the amount of actual work. For
example, she could think about a letter for a few minutes on
Monday, take 5 minutes to write a draft letter on Tuesday,
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another 5 minutes to write the final letter on Wednesday,
another 5 minutes to address the envelope on Thursday, then 2
minutes to put a stamp on it and put it out with the mail on
Friday. Then she could claim that she 'worked' 5 days and since
the daily rate for day care was not 'unreasonable' that the Day
Care was reasonable,
I argue that in order to Reasonable, it must be reasonable
in both cost per hour or day, but also reasonable as
necessitated by the amount of work.
In the courts concluding statements Commissioner Bradford
stated, "Does it make a difference for our daycare purposes if
she works on Ski News one hour a day, three days a week,../'
I argue that the court exceeded its discretion in setting
the threshold of reasonable day cares as excluding only times
when there was "absolutely nothing" and in failing to provide
detailed findings supporting its determination that the amount
(number of days) of day care was reasonable.
This is supported by Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018
The court of Appeals, Orme, J.,held that;
2) The Court abuses its discretion in determining financial
interests of divorced parties when it fails to enter specific,
detailed findings supporting its financial determinations;
findings are adequate only if the are sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps by which
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue is reached."
Sulkin v. Sulkin, 842, P2.d 922, 924 (Utah App. 1992)

"Detailed findings are necessary to determine whether trial
court has exercised its discretion in a rational manner.'7

In the courts closing statement and judgment The Court
stated "I can't extrapolate from looking at her daycare which
ones would really be personal needs from the business. I can't
tell that. There's no way I'll be able to tell that. I could sit
here until doomsday and not be able to know that one and so it
appears that the judgment for the daycare is appropriate."
I argue that the court exceeds its discretion if the court
can't tell if the day care is work related or not. With the
hobby related nature of the business, large amount of Off Season
day care and the lack of necessary supporting and detailed
findings it appears judgment that 100% of the day care was
reasonable and work related is in error.
Some adjustment should have been made to adjust for the
non-work related portion of the day care.
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Issue 2 - Day Care Costs Exceed Income
The second Issue is that all documentation clearly indicate
that the Total Cost of Day Care exceeds the Income generated
based on both Totals in the 2002 Tax Form provided by Susan and
Losses in the past year and all previous years and multi-year
averages.
Statutes and the code indicate that it does not make sense
to work if the Cost of Child Care approach or equal the amount
of income the custodial parent can earn.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5. —

Imputed income

(7) (d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the
1
parents minor children approach or equal the amount of income
the custodial parent can earn;.
Total Income documentation provided by Susan on Form 1120S
Corporate Tax Form for tax year 2002 is $7284 which is less than
the total spent for Day care of 9486.33 requested.
My Exhibit B includes a similar Form 1120S Corporate Tax
Form for 2001 which shows a Loss for 2001 of ($7,089) a loss.
In my Exhibit A I include a list of the historical losses
of Ski New from 1997 to 2001 with the following note:
"Invoices at the end of 2001 were sent out late causing
payments that would normally have been included in 2001 income
to not be received until 2002 showing a larger loss in 2001 and

additional income in 2002."

The facts show a steady trend of

smaller loses each year prior to 2001 then an unusually large
loss followed in 2002 by an unusually large gain clearly
indicating an unusual pattern that supports my the statement
regarding late invoices.
This would cause the difference between income and day care
expenses to make even less sense in that the day care costs
remain the same and the actual income is even less meaning that
the day care costs far exceed the income or very unreasonable.

If averages of any kind are used to adjust for unusually
high and low numbers the resulting income is extremely low or
even negative using as little as a 2 or 3 year average.
The following are multi year averages:
2 year average for 2001 and 2002 would be $100 income.
3 year average for 2000 to 2002 would be ($400) a loss.
4, 5 and 6 year average show an increasing loss.
In (Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1999)
The court of appeals, Billings, J., held that:
3) "Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in calculating
husbands income by averaging last 5 years, rather than
calculating his income based on recent years he received bonus
from his company"
I argue that the court exceeded discretion and fails to
address and provide detailed findings supporting any
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determination that the total cost of day care was reasonable
with respect to the amount of Income.
An clearly documented average of some kind with supporting
detail and guidelines for the future would provide a more
reasonable and fair approach in determining income or loss.
This is supported by Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018
The court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that;
2) The Court abuses its discretion in determining financial
interests of divorced parties when it fails to enter specific,
detailed findings supporting its financial determinations;
findings are adequate only if the are sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps by which
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue is reached,"
Sulkin v. Sulkin, 842, P2.d 922, 924 (Utah App. 1992)
"Detailed findings are necessary to determine whether trial
court has exercised its discretion in a rational manner."
The court, in closing statement, indicate that the issue of
Income (or loss) related to day care is not an issue by stating,
"A Petition to Modify would look at this issue on the ski
business in a whole new vein because now we have a tax return
that's actually turning it into a profitable business and so
that makes it a whole different ball game. And so with that, I
leave you to develop that as you may. That's completely and
entirely up to you."
I argue that there is in fact less income than day care
costs which would eliminate any Imputed Income under the
Guidelines.

.T^hn Thomas

I would argue that this allows Susan to choose to work and
participate in her Hobby related business where the income is
less than cost of Day Care without contributing anything under
the support guidelines and requiring me to provide in essence a
subsidy to her for this hobby related business.
I argue that this is not in the interest of justice and
that the court should consider the income more fully to
determine is it is reasonable under the circumstances.
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Conclusion
Issue 1 - Excessive Day Care
I conclude that the court exceeded its discretion and that
the judgment that 100% of day care costs is not in the interest
of justice.
Statue Statutes were not adhered to relating to Day Care
for when the parent xis working' and Aas necessitated' by work.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2. (23) x\..as necessitated ..."
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.17. (1) "... is working ..."
The Judgment included Day Care Costs that are clearly not
Work Related or Necessary.

Issue 2 - Day Care Costs Exceed Income
The Court committed plain error in determining that the day
was reasonable even though the income generated was shown to be
less than the cost of day care.
Statue Statute coving day care in excess of Income is:
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5. —

Income.

(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist:
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(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the
parents1 minor children approach or equal the amount of income
the custodial parent can earn;
Day Care benefits should not be allowed or deemed
reasonable if it is not reasonable to work due to day care costs
that approach or exceed income.
The court failed to provide detailed findings supporting
its financial determination regarding income vs. day care costs.

Relief Sought
Issue 1 - Excessive Day Care
Reverse and remand for further findings to include a method
to Verify Income and Work Requirements and an adjustment of day care
costs and attorney fees due to the portion of day care time that is
non-work related or necessary.

Issue 2 - Day Care Costs Exceed Income
Reversal - on grounds that income is less than cost of day care.
My Direct Costs:
Bond $300, Filing Fee $205, there are no attorney fees as I am
representing myself in both the District Court and this Appeal.
I Request and equitable distribution of Court Costs, Bonds,
Filing fees, Attorney fees from Trial, and any other costs as deemed
appropriate by the court.
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A portion of the day care has been paid.
I paid approximately 50% of the judgment, an amount of $2500.00,
on April 30, 2004 when this Appeal was filed.
My hope is that through this process, mediation or other dispute
resolution methods, we can establish standards for future day care
costs that are both appropriate based on the unique circumstances
of her work/hobby and in the interest of justice.

Signature

Respectfully submitted this y
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' 2004

John Thomas
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Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1999)
The court of appeals, Billings, J., held that:
3) "Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in calculating
husbands income by averaging last 5 years, rather than
calculating his income based on recent years he received bonus
from his company"
Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018
The court of Appeals, Orme, J.,
2) The Court abuses its discretion in determining financial
interests of divorced parties when it fails to enter specific,
detailed findings supporting its financial determinations;
findings are adequate only if the are sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps by which
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue is reached."
Sulkin v. Sulkin, 842, P2.d 922, 924 (Utah App. 1992)
"detailed findings are necessary to determine whether trial
court has exercised its discretion in a rational manner."
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Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter;
(1) "Adjusted gross income" means income calculated under Subsection 78-45-7.6(1).
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Recovery Services or the Department of Human Services.
(3) "Administrative order" means an order that has been issued by the Office of Recovery Services, the
Department of Human Services, or an administrative agency of another state or other comparable jurisdiction with
similar authority to that of the office.
(4) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered and is calculated using the guidelines before
additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs.
(5) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support table," "base child support obligation table,"
"low income table," or "table" means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-7.14.
(6) "Child" means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a
member of the armed forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high school during the normal and expected year
of graduation and not otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed forces of the
United States; or
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated from earning a living and, if able to provide some financial
resources to the family, is not able to support self by own means.
(7) "Child support" means a base child support award as defined in Section 78-45-2, or a monthly financial award
for uninsured medical expenses, ordered by a tribunal for the support of a child, including current periodic
payments, all arrearages which accrue under an order for current periodic payments, and sum certain judgments
awarded for arrearages, medical expenses, and child care costs.
(8) "Child support order" or "support order" means a judgment, decree, or order of a tribunal whether
interlocutory or final, whether or not prospectively or retroactively modifiable, whether incidental to a proceeding
for divorce, judicial or legal separation, separate maintenance, paternity, guardianship, civil protection, or otherwise
which:
(a) establishes or modifies child support;
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judgment; or
(c) establishes child support or registers a child support order under Title 78, Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act.
(9) "Child support services" or "IV-D child support services" means services provided pursuant to Part D of Title
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 651 et seq.
(10) "Court" means the district court or juvenile court.
(11) "Guidelines" means the child support guidelines in Sections 78-45-7.2 through 78-45-7.21.
(12) "Income" means earnings, compensation, or other payment due to an individual, regardless of source,
whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, pay, allowances, contract payment, or otherwise,
including severance pay, sick pay, and incentive pay. "Income" includes:
(a) all gain derived from capital assets, labor, or both, including profit gained through sale or conversion of
capital assets;
(b) interest and dividends;
(c) periodic payments made under pension or retirement programs or insurance policies of any type;
(d) unemployment compensation benefits;
(e) workers' compensation benefits; and
(f) disability benefits.
(13) "Joint physical custody" means the child stays with each parent overnight for more than 30% of the year,
and both parents contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.
(14) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related insurance costs.
(15) "Obligee" means an individual, this state, another state, or another comparable jurisdiction to whom child
support is owed or who is entitled to reimbursement of child support or public assistance.
(16) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(17) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services.
(18) "Parent" includes a natural parent, or an adoptive parent.
(19) "Split custody" means that each parent has physical custody of at least one of the children.
(20) "State" includes any state, territory, possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
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Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or other comparable domestic or foreign jurisdiction
(21) "Third party" means an agency or a person other than the biological or adoptive parent or a child who
provides care, maintenance, and support to a child
(22) "Tribunal" means the district court, the Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery Services, or
court or administrative agency of any state, territory, possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Native American Tribe, or other comparable domestic or foreign jurisdiction
(23) "Work-related child care costs" means reasonable child care costs for up to a full-i lme work week or traming
schedule as necessitated by the employment or training of a parent under Section 78-45-7,17
(24) "Worksheets" means the forms used to aid in calculating the base child support award

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.16.

Child care expenses.

(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share equally the reasonable work-related child care
expenses of the parents
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin paying his share on a monthly basis
immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be mcurred,
that parent may suspend making monthly payment of that expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a
modification of the child support order
(b) (l) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who incurs child care expense shall provide written
verification of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider
and thereafter on the request of the other parent
(n) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, the parent shall notify the other parent of any change of child
care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of the change
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring child care expenses may be denied
the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b)

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.17.

Child care costs.

(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is presumed, if the custodial parent or the
noncustodial parent, during extended parent-time, is working and actually incurring the child care costs
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded on a case-by-case basis, if the costs
are related to the career or occupational training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the
interest of justice

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5.

Imputed income

(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3), and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities capital gains, social
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job However, if and
only if during the time prior to the original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40
hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child
support
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family Employment Program,
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Aci, Supplemental Security
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance, and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent

(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting
necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and
expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of
gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business income determined
for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to
determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or
employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court finds the
verification is not reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of
Workforce Services may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment
situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the party
defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds
in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as found
in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the
federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or
the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis
for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents1 minor children approach or equal the amount of income the
custodial parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a minor child who is the subject of a child support award
nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support to
the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that
parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.

Addendum C - Final Order

